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(EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE SETTING
IN HUNGARIAN FIRMS 1986-89)
JÁNOS  KÖLLÕ
The paper addresses the question why Hungarian state enterprises cut
employment by two-digit percentages in the last years of state
socialism. It argues that job destruction was a result of changing
incentives and liberties (harder budget constraint, stronger insider
power, loosening political restrictions on downsizing) rather than of
market-related shocks. Changing the inherited combination of output,
employment, and wages could be in the interest of workers, managers,
or both parties. The implications for wages and profits were hard to
predict but the concievable scenarios of adjustment unanimously
implied lower employment. The hypotheses are tested against data on
output, employment, wages and profits from a panel of 2666 firms
observed in 1986 and 1989.
Transitology, primarily engaged with the post-1989 history of Central and
East European societies, pays little attention to the decay of the socialist
system preceeding its sudden political collapse. A 'big-bang approach' to
transition is certainly appropriate in the case of some countries, like
Romania or Czechoslovakia, where the political regime and the economy
remained intact until late 1989, but not in Poland, Hungary or the Soviet
Union where the system underwent remarkable changes between 1985 and
1990.
This paper analyses an area of evolutive change in the last years of state
socialism using Hungarian data.
1 In particular, the paper addresses the
                                                
1 I started research on employment and wage adjustment in 1993/94 when I was visiting
fellow in  János Kornai’s research group at Collegium Budapest – Institute for2
question why employment began to shrink several years before the collapse
of the socialist political system. Why Hungarian state enterprises cut
employment by two-digit percentages in the late 1980s, in a period of
modest economic growth (1.4% per annum in 1985-89) and no dramatic
changes in prices, trade relations, or other key economic indicators?
Table 1. The active population in the pre-transition period in Hungary
(1. January, thousand)
1983 1985 1987 1989 1990
Unemployed - - 6 14 24
Self-employed
1 243 n.a. 330 404 501
Employees, of which
2 4727 (4641) 4555 4418 4267
– Budget sector




4 3963 (3857) 3707 3565 3391
Source: KSH [1991], pp. 19, 38-39, 74.
Notes:
1
 Includes assisting household members and full-time members in business
partnerhips without a legal personality.
2
 Includes employees on military service and non-retired employees older
than the retirement age. Excludes women on child care leave and employed
pensioners.
3
 Health, education, culture, and public administration. Institutions
employing more than 50 workers in 1989 and 1990.
4
 Calculated from the table by deducting budget sector employment from
total employment. Figures in paranthesis are interpolated estimates.
The magnitude of change is illustrated by Table 1. Total employment
(the sum of dependent-status employment and self-employment) fell
slightly, by only 2.9% in 1985–90 but the number of employees decreased
by more than 8%. The decline fell entirely on the enterprise sector where it
exceeded 12% and implied a loss of about 1/2 million jobs. This figure still
underestimates the magnitude of net job destruction in medium-sized and
large firms where employment was predictably lower by as much as 17%
in 1989 compared to 1986.
2
One of the reasons why job destruction could remain almost
unnoticed was the outstanding role of self-employment (as opposed to open
                                                                                                                                              
Advanced Study. I am grateful to him for his encouragement and criticism. I also
thank  György Lázár for support with data and  Olivier J. Blanchard, Simon
Commander and Gábor Kõrösi for comments on earlier versions. Errors are mine.
2 This figure comes from the firm sample introduced later in the paper, covers
enterprises employing more than 20 workers, and compares yearly average figures.3
unemployment) in absorbing redundant labour. Many workers left the
enterprise sector to start a business voluntarily but, as emphasised by
Gábor R. [1997], Czakó [1996] and others, self-employment was also a
resort for workers losing their jobs, or being at risk of involuntary jobloss.
A fall in labour demand (unrelated to external market pressures) was
also observed at the micro level in both Hungary and Poland.
3 In their
analysis of Polish state enterprises over the period 1983–1988  Lehmann
and Schaffer [1995] found that employment was shrinking in the majority
of firms and they observed roughly the same rate of job destruction in firms
paying below and above the estimated marginal product of labour. Kõrösi
[1997] found that employment fell by 21% in 1986–89 in Hungarian
exporting firms. His repeated cross-section estimates of a labour demand
equation suggested low output elasticities, gradually rising from 1/3 to 3/4
of the levels observed during the transition. Estrin and Svejnar [1996] also
observed net job destruction and loose linkage between output and
employment in their Polish and Hungarian firm samples.
These observations motivate the paper to look at employment decline
in detail using enterprise-level information from the period 1986–89.
Section 1 starts by discussing employment and wage setting under
state socialist conditions, in a regime where (i) firms were constrained in
wage-setting (ii) enterprises had an incentive to raise employment beyond
the efficient level (iii) the actual wage-employment combination was
achieved in a bargaining process and (therefore) was not optimal for
workers.
Section 2  turns to the immediate pre-transition period when the
enlargement of enterprise autonomy, the hardening of the budget
constraint, and the liberalization of firing practices created incentives for
downsizing. It also argues that, given the properties of the state socialist
heritage (points ii and iii above), downsizing could be Pareto-improving.
Though the conceivable scenarios of downsizing appear to be different in
terms of wage and profit change, they are similar in that they unanimously
imply a fall in the level of employment.
Following the discussion of causes and possible implications Section
4 confronts the hypotheses with data from 1986-89 and Section 5  draws
conclusions.
                                                
3 Though a part of the outflow from the enterprise sector was clearly supply-driven it
still remains a question why enterprises, for the first time in socialist history, did not
try to fill their vacancies produced by voluntary quits.4
1. The Socialist Firm
Wage setting
Under central planning the wage bill was determined by the planners. The
wage plan was the single most stringent limit set for enterprises as argued
in detail in Chapter 16 of Kornai [1980].
The case of Hungary is more complex since the country abolished
central planning already in 1968 and controlled wages by means of taxes
since then. Firms were free to set wages within broad limits suggested
(rather than prescribed) for occupational categories. Taxes were levied on
the wage increment with rates depending on the relation of wage change to
a reference indicator. The details of the tax system changed rather
frequently but in the typical setting the tax was a function of the ratio of
wage bill growth to value added growth. The tax was punitive with
extremely high marginal rates.
It is important to note that the ruling tax regime punished the growth
of the wage bill but (in principle) opened an unlimited range for the
differentiation of average wages. With the exeption of a few years of
stringent wage policies enterprises could raise the average wage tax-free by
reducing labour hoarding. The tax regime is insufficent for explaining why
inter-enterprise wage differentials remained modest. At least three equally
important reasons might be mentioned.
First, though the tax rules explicitly encouraged the trading off of
jobs for wages other rules and incentives strongly discouraged it. Severe
political constraints were imposed on ‘firing without a cause’: a firm
dismissing workers for wage gains would have risked serious political
sanctions.
4
Second, employment cuts resulting in lower output were at odds with
other incentives like the rewards attached to growth, market share, capacity
utilization, or responsibility for supplies and CMEA-exports.
Third, wage cuts potentially resulting from productivity losses were
usually averted by wage subsidies, exemptions from taxation, or value
added growth rates themselves were manipulated by transfers or via prices
                                                
4 The only case when  hundreds of workers were dismissed collectively under János
Kádár’s regin (Rába, city of Gyõr, 805 workers) was put on the agenda of a Politburo
session on 29 May 1979.5
(Kornai and Matits [1986]). The allocation of subsidies followed relatively
simple rules. Bargaining power increased with firm size because the
number of established communication channels between the firm and the
Party – hence ability to bargain at all – was a function of size. Keeping firm
size in terms of employment constant the likelihood of subsidies increased
with capital assets. Cukor and Kertesi [1987] provided empirical evidence
on that and argued that the cost of refusing subsidies was higher, other
things equal, if low wages reduced the utilization of large assets of fixed
capital. Finally, subsidies were more likely when ‘equalizing wage
differentials’ had to be adjusted.
5
Prohibitive taxes, political constraints, and manager’s incentives on
the one hand, subsidies on the other, thus operated as an equalizing
mechanism: the risk that some firms set wages high above the industry
average, or lag behind substantially, was actually rather small. The
assumption of a wage level (or a wage range) quoted by the state seems to
be a relevant assumption even in the special case of post-1968 Hungary
where firms had limited freedom in wage setting.
Employment
To illustrate the difference between socialist and capitalist firms we draw
Figure 1. The curves emanating from the bottom left corner of the wage-
employment plane are iso-profit curves: the loci of wage-employment
combinations resulting in the same level of profit.
6
An iso-profit contour is increasing and concave left of the turning
point – where marginal product equals the wage – and falls afterwards. The
curvature of the iso-profit contour beyond the turning point is shaped by
                                                
5 As, for instance,  the price of hard manual work increased – reflecting a general
improvement of educational levels, the ceasing of migration from villages to industrial
centers, and a consequent fall in the supply of unskilled labour – the wage levels
generated by the ‘value added-wage growth rule’ would have been insufficient to
maintain staff levels at firms with predominantly unqualified jobs. Subsidies were
often explicitly targeted to mitigate ‘labour shortages’ of this kind.
6 Let R(n) be a revenue function with the usual properties R’(n)>0  and R’’(n)<0. If
(w*,n*) is a wage-employment combination for which R’(n*)=w* and R(n*)-
w*n*=p* then R(n) - wn = p* defines an iso-profit curve in the wage-employment
plane the slope of which is given by [R’(n) - w]/n and thus it’s turning point is at
(w*,n*).
  The iso-profit curves serve as indifference contours with lower curves
representing higher profit. The framework used here follows the introductory sections
of McDonald and Solow [1982]6
decreasing marginal revenue (implying successively increasing wage cuts
as we move to higher employment levels) and a size effect (making higher
profits available at the cost of successively decreasing wage cuts). As
suggested in Appendix 1 an iso-profit curve is likely concave in the relevant
range where marginal product is well above zero.
Under state socialism firms employed more workers than a capitalist
enterprise facing similar wages and prices. The profit-maximising firm
(subject to w* quoted by a union or government) is likely to choose
E(w*,nE) where the wage equals the marginal product.
7 The choice of the









E is an equilibrium point in the sense that, other things unchanged,
the firm has no motivation to leave it. S is different in that state socialist
firms were always ready to expand employment beyond its current level. In
the short run firms were prevented from doing so by their budget constraint
but the management could bargain for higher prices or fiscal transfers
making higher employment compatible with enlarged post-subsidy
revenues. In this sense the assumption of a binding level of profit (setting a
maximum for n S at a given wage) would miss the important point about
firm behavior. Kornai’s notion of an ‘unconstrained’ demand for labour
([1980], Chs. 11, 16) refers exactly to that: irrespective of the level of the
wage, in lack of a binding level of profit nS has a tendency to move to the
right.
                                                
7 The optimum is different if both employment and wages are set in a bargain as shown
by McDonald and Solow.7
Cooperation and conflict between workers and managers
When the budget constraint is soft workers and managers are interested in
cooperating against the state, since they can mutually benefit from
subsidies, but it does not follow that they agree on how to distribute the
subsidies among themselves.
The optimal choice of workers lies in the tangency of an iso-profit
curve, regarded as binding momentarily by the management, and the
highest worker indifference curve available at that profit level. For finding
the place of this point we need reasonable assumptions about the
representative worker’s indifference curve (his evaluation of wages and
employment). Since employment was full under socialism higher
employment in the firm had no extra value for the workers. Lower
employment, by contrast, implied a loss of utility for them because of the
cost of job search, or the loss of seniority-related wage returns, among
others. We may assume therefore that the representative worker's
indifference curve was flat right of the actual level of employment, but








Suppose that the point S chosen by the firm accidentally provided the
highest utility available for workers, at a given profit, as on  Chart 2.
Workers and managers could always gain from state subsidies so they kept
on bargaining for state support. We may think of subsidization as a
permission to move to a lower pre-tax profit rate, somewhere to the SAC
area. Workers obviously preferred A to other points and pressed the
management to fight for wage subsidies.8
The managers of state socialist enterprises benefited from higher
wages for a number of reasons (peace within the firm, lower labour
turnover) but they were also rewarded for higher output, as well as for
higher profit. The success criteria actually applied by goverment and Party
officials under socialism suggested that a ‘proper’ mixture of a number of
indicators – rather than a single criterion - was what mattered in  evaluating
managers (Laki [1985]). If we assume, accordingly, that managers strived
for a combination of relevant success criteria – wage, employment and
profit in our presentation – the point they wanted to achieve was
somewhere in the SAC triangle (V). If they had at least some bargaining
power the outcome was different of A - the firm moved away from
worker’s optimum.
8
2. The Pre-Transition Reforms and their Implications
Unlike in Czechoslovakia, Romania or the GDR the transition process in
Hungary was preceeded by a period of evolutive change. The following
paragraphs give a brief list of market-oriented reforms relevant to the
labour market by grouping them into three clusters:
The delegation of managing rights to firms. The transferring of rights
to manage came in both formal and informal ways. The establishment of
elected Enterprise Councils, Delegate’s Assemblies and General
Assemblies (instead of subordination to branch ministries) created a legal
framework for these changes in 1985. By the end of the period most
Hungarian firms could autonomously decide upon corporate structure,
factor inputs and the output mix.
Hardening of the budget constraint. A series of market-oriented
reforms contributed to the monetization of the economy and the gradual
hardening of the budget constraint. These reforms included cuts of fiscal
subsidies, wide-ranging price liberalization, tax reforms (Western-type
value added and personal income taxation), the establishment of
commercial banks and the foundation of the Stock Exchange. Though these
early reforms did not mean the end of goverment intervention, fiscal
subsidization, and the bailing-out of bankrupt enterprises (huge loss-makers
typically remained under direct government control even after 1985) they
                                                
8 Note that after a shift to higher employment levels (say from S to V) the union
indifference map should be rescaled. This is so because in this presentation worker’s
utility is a function of the change, not the level, of employment. Their preferences are
transitive on the (w, Dn) plane but not on the (w, n) plane.9
certainly signalled a departure from a comprehensive system of
paternalistic income redistribution. The nature of change is well shown by
time series presented in  Kornai ([1996], p.18): the proportion of firms
mentioning demand-side factors among the causes of capacity
underutilization considerably increased in this period, while the number of
complaints on input ‘shortages’ substantially decreased.
Freedom to trade off employment for wages. The pre-transition
reforms made the employment-wage trade-off a feasible option by
removing the political barriers to dismissals and changing the
management's incentives. The government introduced the first elements of
an unemployment benefit system in 1987, signalling the end of political
constraints on mass layoffs, demolishing the taboo of full employment, and
allowing managers to reduce employment without risking their own jobs. It
should be added that wage bill taxation was maintained until 1991 (in a
more sophisticated form in some years). Increasing wages without reducing
employment remained a costly option at the eve of transition.
We believe that the reforms changed the motivation of the players
and the rules of the game in many ways. The ceasing of stringent state
control on the one hand, and the lack of outside private owners on the
other, provided the managers and core workers of state enterprises with an
unprecedented degree of autonomy. Equally important, they had stronger
motivation to find an optimum within the limits of sales revenues. They
also had new options including downsizing. The targets chosen by firms
may have been different – depending on who made the decisions – but the
conceivable scenarios were common in that they all implied job
destruction.
Some of the possible scenarios are based on worker control. One can
assume that workers do not seek higher profit but they do not want to drive
the firm out of the market by pushing profit deep below zero. What they
likely try to do is maximising utility at close-to-zero profit. If at the outset
the firm’s profit was low (and we may assume it with state socialist firms)
they look for points on, or left of, the current iso-profit curve. This is
shown on  Chart 3. Apart from the special case when S is a tangency
optimum the ‘union’ indifference curve crosses the iso-profit curve at S and
C.
9 The points between the indifference curve and the profit curve are
Pareto-superior to S. If workers have their own way they choose B.
                                                
9 Whether the worker’s indifference curve is kinked or well-behaved bears no
importance in this case.10
In a variant of this scenario decisions are made by, and in the interest
of, a small group of core workers. With respect to profit such a small group
is likely to behave as the community of all workers but its utility curve is
kinked at the level of group membership as argued in Carruth and Oswald
[1987]. If decisions are made by such a group the likely outcome is D, the
highest possible wage consistent with the prevailing level of profit. The
position of D with respect to C is uncertain but it is North-West of S as









In other scenarios control is taken over by managers. Managers in
the period under examination had several reasons to seek higher profit:
high profit could raise their reputation on the emerging managerial labour
market; it could help them in the newly-born commercial banking system;
or they wanted to become owners of the firms. A profit-maximising
manager is generally interested in reaching point E, a wage at the
reservation level w
0 and an employment level at which marginal product is
equal w
0. Whether this point can be reached is a matter of bargaining power
but the manager certainly wants to move West or South-West of S.
In principle, workers or managers uninterested in profit may have
tried to maintain employment and raise wages at the expense of profit but
we do not regard it as a highly relevant option given the proximity of nS to
a level exhausting the firm’s intakes at any particular point in time, under
socialism. In principle this option would have implied a move to the North
of S.
                                                
10 The boundaries of the area Pareto-superior to S are the actual iso-profit curve, the
demand curve, and a horizontal line at height ws.11
A common corrolary of the more relevant scenarios of pure worker
control, profit-maximising managerial control - or a mixture of the two – is
that the reforms bring about labour shedding without any external market
impetus. The degree to which employment cuts are accompanied by wage
increase depends on the nature of decision-making. Similarly, expectations
concerning profits are uncertain but the guess is that even under strong
worker influence profits do not change considerably.
The aim of the following empirical analysis is to identify typical
paths on the wage-employment plane between 1986 and 1989, that is, to
assess how output, employment, wages and profits were changing, and how
they related to each other. There are two important details to be adressed
before starting the analysis.
The first point is connected with the nature of labour shedding. If
workers are fired on a non-random basis the observable outcome of the
adjustment process is affected in two ways. On the one hand, productivity-
based selection weakens the link between employment change and output
change since the dismissal of the least productive workers has a minor
impact on output. On the other hand, by shedding the least productive
workers the firm’s staff changes in favour of the more qualified and more
experienced workers. The average wage increases for that reason but we
can not take it for granted that the remaining workers are better paid. The
wage gain from labour shedding can only be measured by the evolution of
residual wages, that is, wages controlled for demographic and human
capital variables. This problem will be addressed in Section 4.
A second difficulty is raised by the fact that personal income
taxation,  started in 1988 in Hungary, introduced a wedge between the
dynamics of gross and net wages. In the paper we shall deal with  gross
relative wages and their relation to output, employment and profit.
Appendix 4  discusses some problems potentially stemming from this
choice.
Keeping these warnings in mind the following sections will analyse
the path of firms in three steps. First we look at the typical path in terms of
output, employment and wages by estimating a model of simultaneous
employment and wage setting. Second, residual wages and their relation to
labour shedding will be analysed in order to check whether the observed
link between average wages and labour shedding is real or spurious.
Finally, we  relate profit change to employment and wage change in order
to capture the impact of downsizing on employers.12
3. Data
The data come from an enterprise panel covering 2666 firms observed in
both 1986 and 1989 in the framework of the Wage Survey of the National
Labour Centre of Hungary. The firms are randomly selected. The sample
covers 51.7% of firms employing more than 20 workers in 1986. The firms
in the sample employed 68.1% of all workers in the respective size
categories. In addition to enterprise-level information the records comprise
individual data of a 10% random sample of workers in 1986 as well as in
1989 (but the persons interviewed are not identifyable across waves). The
individual data will be used to draw residual wages. The samples are
described in detail in Kertesi and Köllõ [1995].
Unfortunately, enterprises involved in spin-offs, dismantling,
mergers or any other change affecting their legal personality (and hence
their identification code) are automatically excluded from a longitudinal
sample. This restriction is severe in an economy where thousands of firms
dismantle or merge with others in search of more efficient organizational
forms, in order to seek rents, avoid taxes or hide from the eyes of creditors.
From the 4032 firms observed in 1986 we could follow 3250 over the
period 1986-89, and a further 584 had to be excluded because their data
were strongly biased by changes of corporate structure.
11
4. Results
Output, employment and wages
As shown in Table 2 the output of the median firm did not change between
1986 and 1989 but it cut employment by more than 20 per cent. The
employment cuts were virtually equal at firms with falling and rising
output. At first glance employment seems uncorrelated with sales
performance but wages appear to differ in expanding and contracting firms.
                                                
11 The methods of data cleaning are presented in Köllõ [1996].13











Output* 99.0 80.6 125.7
Employment 78.4 76.7 80.1
Real wage* 131.2 124.1 138.2
*Deflated with the branch-level producer price index
For obtaining more informative results we estimate a model of
simultaneous employment and wage setting (1):
 (1) Dlog n = b11. Dlog q + b12.Dlog (w/p) + b13. X + e1
Dlog w = b21 Dlog(q/n) + b22. log(p) + b23 Z + e2
where p is the producer price index , q is output (sales revenues net of
material cost, deflated with p) and X and Z are vectors of control variables.
q, p, X , Z are exogeneous. Delta refers to change between 1986 and 1989.
Estimations of (1) and related calculations are available for a similar
enterprise panel from 1989–92 in  Köllõ [1996], therefore we have the
possibility to compare the results from the late eighties with ones coming
from the times of transition.
The elasticity of employment to output estimated from (1) is 0.19.
This figure compared to a similar estimate from 1989–92 (0.35) seems
rather low, supportive of the conjecture that the sudden change of employer
behavior was a result of institutional change rather than of market
pressures.
The rate of job destruction was highest in the medium size category:
large firms (employing more than 1000 workers) had a 12.5 per cent higher
level of employment than had medium sized firms, in 1989 relative to
1986, other things equal. This outcome also seems consistent with the
framework developed earlier. While the state held important positions in
the Enterprise Councils of large firms (and kept some large firms under
direct ministry control) the transferring of managing rights to the enterprise
was fully completed in the case of medium-sized firms. Therefore more
severe employment cuts are expected here than at large firms (or small
ones where the management had a higher degree of freedom even before).14
The employment equations of  Table 3  suggest strong trade-off
between wages and employment: a one per cent higher rate of change of
the average wage appears to reduce employment by more than a half per
cent. (The causation can be reversed as the equation was normalized for
employment by choice). The parameter (-0.56) is three times as high as in
1989–92
(-0.17). Though the intepretation of this coefficient can be a matter of
debate, in the particular case of the pre-transition firm assuming direct
linkage between the reduction of employment and fast-growing average
wages is supported by at least two arguments. Firms with an accumulated
stock of low-productivity jobs could downsize employment without a
major effect on output (and hence with a positive effect on productivity and
wages). In addition they could choose to cut both output and employment
with the very aim to achive higher wages, as was discussed in Section 1.
Table 3.  Estimation of employment and wage adjustment
(Model (1), two-stage least squares regression)
Employment equation Wage equation
Coeff. (t) Coeff (t)
Output 0.190 18.7 Productivity 0.060 6.2
Real wage -0.564 -11.9 Price index 0.064 1.7




Exporter ($) 0.082 7.2 100% non-
manual
0.086 0.6




Constant -0.197 -15.4 Constant 0.790 17.2
aR
2 , N 0.365 2666 0.092 2666
The wage equation in Table 3 suggests relatively week connection –
an elasticity of 0.06 – between wages and productivity (or the branch-
specific price index). It might be added that by regressing the producer real15
wage on productivity in a univariate model we get a far higher elasticity of
0.2. This is consistent with the finding of a highly significant trade-off
between employment and wages because the parameter of the univariate
estimation combines the effect of a ‘sharing rule’ (higher productivity leads
to higher wage) with a feedback effect (that leads from higher wages to
lower employment at given sales revenues, hence to higher productivity
and back to wages).
The first results suggest that the typical Hungarian firm substiantally
reduced employment between 1986 and 1989; employment cuts were
loosely related to sales performance; and more labour shedding was
associated with higher wage increase. However, the wage gains from
labour shedding indicated by model (1) may be spurious, calling for the
study of residual wages.
Residual wages
Residual wages are obtained from Mincer-type earnings functions
estimated for 1986 and 1989 using the individual data of workers employed
in the firms under examination (The equations are presented in  Appendix
2). We calculate the error terms of the equations, take enterprise means,
and study how they relate to other indicators of the firm. In case the finding
is that more labour shedding between 1986 and 1989 was associated with a
rise of the residual wage, at given sales dynamics, we have more reason to
believe that the jobs of fired workers were traded off for higher wages paid
to the remaining insiders.
 12
The calculations are restricted to firms employing at least 500
workers in both 1986 and 1989 and thus providing a sample of 50 or more
workers for the Wage Survey (where the sampling quota is roughly 10%).
                                                
12 Deviations from predicted wages may reflect a series of unobserved factors like work
intensity, polluted workplace, or the risk of corruption but they can also hint at rents
paid above (or below) the market level of wages. The equalizing differentials probably
do not change considerably over a relatively short period of time but the rents are
certainly more variable and are expected to respond to changes of the average product.16
Table 4. The effect of output change and employment change on average
wages and average residual wages (Ordinary least squares regressions)
Dependent w89 r89
Coeff. (t) Coeff. (t)
Lagged term (w86,
r86)
0.998 31.1 0.634 18.1
Change of output 0.200 14.2 0.071 5.1
Change of employment -0.494 32.9 -0.038 3.8
Constant 0.162 0.6 -0.025 4.1
Wage equation: aR
2 = 0.5993, F=643.9 (.0000), Nobs=1164
Residual wage equation: aR
2 = 0.2352, F=120.22 (.0000), Nobs=1164
Table 4 presents two wage equations. In the first column the average
wage in 1989 (w89) is regressed on a lagged term (w86), change of output,
and change of employment. In the second column the average wage figures
are replaced for the residual wage figures (r89, r86). All variables are in
logs.
In the equations the lagged terms have been used as indicators for the
change in the effect of ignored variables - the closer their coefficients to 1,
the less these relationships changed. In the wage equation the parameter is
close to 1 suggesting that the ignored wage effects were rather stable. In the
residual wage equation the coefficient is far lower than unity, indicating
that some unobserved reasons leading to positive or negative deviations
from ‘expected’ earnings may have changed during the period.
The effect of both output and employment is markedly stronger in
the average wage equation. The coefficients of the employment terms bear
special importance from our point of view: they appear to be negative and
significant in both equations.
It seems that more labour shedding at given output led to higher
wages indeed, even after allowing for changes in the staff’s composition,
but this effect was actually very weak. Evaluating the outcome at the mean
change of sales and two relevant points of employment change (one
standard deviation range around the mean) gives the following results.
Cutting employment by 2% had no effect on the residual wage; cutting jobs
by 47% induced a 2.4% residual wage increase. Undoubtedly, two and a
half per cent is a very small gain from shedding half of the firm's staff,
raising doubts whether labour shedding was indeed beneficial for the
incumbent workers.17
Table 5. Output and employment in four quartiles of residual wage change
Quartiles of residual wage change
Median 1989/Median 1986 Lowest 2. and 3. Highest
Output 0.96 0.97 1.07
Employment 0.77 0.82 0.80
Mean errors in the
quartiles:
Mean error 1986 .038 -.003 -.031
Mean error 1989 -.121 -.009 .130
Note: Firms employing more than 500 workers
We may reverse the question, however, and ask how the actual wage
gains emerged. Table 5. gives median figures of output and employment in
the quartiles of residual wage change. The data suggest that in the firms
where residual wages grew fast employment decreased substantially (in
line with other groups) while output exceeded its 1986 level by 7%.
The conclusions encouraged by the evidence in this section might be
summarized in two statements. First, it seems that in many cases the
increase of the average wage (associated with massive labour shedding)
covered no more than the rising cost of labour due to its improving quality.
Second, we nevertheless observe that the typical firm gaining in terms of
residual wages eliminated a relatively large proportion of its jobs despite a
minor growth of its output.
It should be added that by restricting the analysis to a longitudinal
sample of large firms we certainly underestimate the importance of
downsizing – as a source of wage gains – in the economy. The dissolution
of large state firms often took the form of spin-offs,  cases when smaller
groups of managers and core workers shifted assets from the master
enterprise to new firms and set higher-than-average wages (financed from
higher labour productivity)
Profits
For a brief overview of how profits were affected by downsizing we
grouped the enterprises into quintiles by change of employment and change
of the real product wage and looked at profit change in these groups. The18
change of the profit rate in a cell is affected by the relation of productivity
change and wage change. We are particularly interested in the question
whether the productivity gains associated with large-scale labour shedding
could cover the rapid growth of wages at downsizing firms.
To reduce the disturbances caused by industry and price effects the
deviation of the observed profit change from its predicted value was used
as a success indicator of employers. The prediction was calculated from a
model regressing the percentage change of the profit rate on the producer
price index, output change, and dummies for exporters and one-digit
industries (Appendix 3). The residual profit change obtained in this way is
expected to respond to firm-level decisions, concerning employment and
wages, more than does the raw variable. Table 6 shows the mean change of
the residual profit and the number of firms in each cell. (In the calculation
of the mean firms were weighted with employment in the base year.)
The cells where profits grew, or decreased by less than 1%, are
separated from the others by a winding line in Table 1. The impression is
that large-scale downsizing was associated with relatively favourable profit
records. (Cells left of the line). It seems that the major source of profit
squeeze was the lack of downsizing, especially when it was accompanied
by above-the-average wage growth.
Table 6.  Percentage change of the residual profit/sales ratio: Weighted
group means by change of employment and change of the real
product wage. (Number of firms in paranthesis)
Quintiles by
change of
Quintiles by change of employment:




























































0.53 0.71 0.80 0.88 1.00 N=266619
The firms in the upper left cell are particularly interesting from the
perspective of the discussion. These enterprises cut the number of jobs by
almost 50% and increased the average wage by 70 per cent between 1986
and 1989. The number of firms in the group is large, 246 as opposed to an
expected frequency of 107. Despite the fast wage growth characteristic of
the group, profits decreased by only 1.02 percentage points, which appears
to be a minor fall compared to the average.
The test applied here is undoubtedly elementary but, perhaps, allows
the conclusion that contracting firms had relatively favourable profit
records. While it is true that large-scale labour shedding tended to induce a
rise in the average cost of labour, and sometimes was associated with
growing residual wages, it seems that the rising average product of labour
could generally accomodate the wage increment.
5. Conclusions
The immediate pre-transition years do not give the impression of a
motionless world waiting for the ‘big bang’. Actually, the firm-level and
individual data suggest substantial changes of employment and wages. The
transformation of the labour market definitely started several years before
the political collapse of state socialism in Hungary.
The paper attributed massive labour shedding to institutional reforms
rather than market-related shocks, arguing that the elimination of labour
hoarding on the one hand, and a move to the West from the starting wage-
employment combination on the other, was in the interest of workers,
managers, or both parties.
The nature of downsizing (in terms of profit change and wage
change) is a question to be addressed in empirical research. A short panel
of Hungarian enterprises from 1989/86 suggested massive labour shedding
that was rather loosely correlated with output. Average wages grew faster
in firms shedding a larger proportion of their staff but we found that a large
part of the resulting productivity gain was actually used to finance the
growing average cost of a smaller (and better) labour force. Worker's gains
from labour shedding were relatively modest (albeit positive). Huge
residual wage gains were nevertheless achieved in firms where severe
employment cuts occured despite a (minor) growth of output. We observed
minor impact on profits: it seemed that the returns from downsizing could
generally finance the growth of wage cost.20
These observations seem to support the conclusion that the
elimination of labour hoarding had been started already before 1990 and
the bias towards high employment and low wages, characteristic of the
state socialist regime, was to some extent corrected in the pre-transition
period. Workers remaining in employment gained rather than lost from
labour shedding while firms did not lose in terms of profitability (or they
lost for reasons other than employment and wage adjustment). The loss of
workers pushed out of employment belongs to the full picture and waits for
deeper research in the future.21
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Appendix 1
The second derivative of the iso-profit curve yields a condition of
concavity:
R’’ < 2(R’-R/n)/n
that is difficult  to evaluate. We argue that at levels of n where the
marginal product is significantly higher than zero the iso-profit curve
is concave. We show it for the case of the zero-profit curve.
Let n be an employment level above the efficient point. Along the zero-
profit curve the wage is set so that w= R(n)/n. Concavity implies that:
(1)  w(n+1)-w(n)<w(n)-w(n-1)
that is:
(2) R(n+1) /(n+1) + R(n-1)/(n-1) < 2R(n)/n
We can rewrite (2) as:
(3) [n/(n+1)]R(n+1) + [n/(n-1)]R(n-1) < 2R(n).
The concavity of R implies that:
(4) [n/(n+1)]R(n+1) + [1-n/(n+1)]R(n-1) < R(n).
If it is true that:
(5) { n/(n-1) - [1-n/(n+1)] }R(n-1) < R(n)




Consider firms with 10, 100,...,1000 employees. Adding one worker to the
staff implies a percentage change of 10%, 1% and 0.1% respectively. The
critical values (n
2+1)/(n
2-1) are 1.02, 1.0002,..., 1.000002. It follows that
unless an 1% change of employment implies less than 0.2%, 0.002%, ... ,
0.0002% change in output, (6) holds and we are at the concave region of
the iso-profit curve.24
Appendix 2
Earnings functions for 1986 and 1989
Model: Ordinary least squares regressions. Sample: Workers in the 2666 firms in the
panel. Dependent: log gross monthly earnings 1986, 1989
1986 1989
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
Gender= Male 0.298 138.3 0.311 121.2
Age 0.038 66.6 0.040 58.9
Age squared (/00) -0.037 -52.4 -0.040 -46.1
Education*:
Less than completed primary -0.084 -52.4 -0.059 -13.9
Vocational manual 0.083 33.4 0.079 27.1
Secondary 0.090 30.2 0.110 30.7
Higher 0.274 50.2 0.381 60.1
Job category*:
Non-manual 0.092 30.2 0.178 50.2
Manager 0.544 53.0 0.831 72.3
Region dummies (16 regions) yes yes
Industry dummies (36 branches) yes yes
Constant 7.684 8.022
aR2, Nobs: 0.4377 88,089 0.4392 87,747
* Reference categories for education and job category are primary school; manual job
Appendix 3
Estimation of profit change in 1986–89




Producer price index 9.909 3.3
Output 1989/86 1.199 8.8
Rubel exporter (1986) -1.271 2.9
Dollar exporter (1986) -0.623 1.5
One digit industry dummies yes 27.2
Constant -18.959 5.1
aR
2 : 0.1114, F = 34.4 (0.0000), Root MSE: 7.66. F-test for the
joint significance of industry dummies. Nobs=266625
Appendix 4
On the effect of the personal income tax on labour demand
Preceeding the introduction of the personal income tax in 1988 taxes were
charged on various components of the firm’s revenues and expenditures. It
is difficult, if not impossible, to tell how the tax burden on the factors of
production (on their costs and revenues) actually changed as a result of
PIT.
Since PIT is a highly progressive tax, the prior is that its introduction
induced particularly fast growth of the labour cost in high-wage firms. The
expectation therefore is that the higher was a firm’s wage level in 1986 the
lower was its demand for labour in 1989, other things equal.
If it were indeed the case we would have a simple alternative
explanation for massive job destruction before the transition: the
introduction of PIT increased the cost of labour and led to a drop of labour
demand. The link between output and employment was weak because
demand primarily fell where wages were high in the base period.
At this point we present evidence suggesting that the effect of PIT on
labour demand was probably weak. A possible explanation for that is that
higher wages were associated with higher taxes already before the
introduction of PIT. Therefore the change in the relative cost of labour was
not as dramatic as suggested by the explicit tax rules.
Employment equation (OLS)
Dependent: Employment 1989/86 (log)
Coeff. t-value
Output 1989/86 (log) 0.211 23.2
Net wage cost 1989/86 (log) -0.769 29.9
Average wage 1986 (log) 0.001 0.1
Rouble exporter 0.009 0.7
Dollar exporter 0.043 3.9
One digit sector dummies yes
aR
2 0.4055
F (11, 2654) 164.6
Nobs 2666
The first statement is tested by means of a labour demand equation
regressing employment on output, net real wage cost (change of the net
wage inflated with the branch-level producer price index), controls, and the26
1986 level of the average wage.
13 This variable is intended to capture the
effect of PIT under the assumption that labour cost grew faster where w
86
was higher, holding the change of the net wage constant.
The results in Table A3 suggest no statistically significant difference
between low-wage and high-wage firms in terms of employment dynamics
between 1986 and 1989. A possible reason is that higher wages implied
higher taxes already before 1988. This conjecture is supported by the
following figures showing  total outlays for wages and taxes (net wages
plus taxes per employee in 1986, gross wages plus taxes in 1989) as a
function of net wages. (Gross and net were equal by definition in 1986). It
is apparent that taxes were increasing in net wages, already in 1986, though
their linkage became undoubtedly stronger by 1989. This is shown by the
fitted curves and their estimated slopes b=1.23 in 1986 and b=1.51 in 1989.
Wages plus taxes per employee as a function of net wages in 1986 and
1989
These findings suggest several conclusions. We probably make no
serious mistake by ignoring the effect of PIT (or of base-period wage
levels) on the dynamics of employment. It should be kept in mind,
nevertheless, that the growth of take-home pay lagged behind the growth of
labour cost substiantally between 1986 and 1989. Our estimations allow the
study of worker's share, or the relative wage gains and losses of various
groups. However, relative wage gains can actually mean a loss in absolute
terms.
                                                
13 The net average wage figure was drawn by ‘taxing’ the gross average wage, figure
using the parameters of the 1989 personal income tax. The calculation is admittedly
rough.